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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Brandon Dean Kingsley appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession 
of a controlled substance, methamphetamine. Mr. Kingsley pleaded guilty but 
preserved the right to appeal from the denial of his motion to suppress. He asserts that 
the district court erred by denying that motion. This Reply Brief addresses the State's 
assertions that Mr. Kingsley was not detained, that the search incident to arrest doctrine 
applies, and that any detention of Mr. Kingley was supported by reasonable, articulable 
suspicion. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Kingsley's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Kingsley's motion to suppress? 
2 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Kingsley's Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Kingsley asserts that he was detained the moment Detective Todd ordered 
him to get off his cell phone. Because that detention was not supported by reasonable, 
articulable suspicion, Mr. Kingsley submits that the district court erred by denying his 
motion to suppress. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Kingsley's Motion To Suppress 
The State's first assertion in this case is that, "[t]here is nothing in the record to 
suggest Kingsley was compelled to walk over to the officer, nor that [Kingsley] could not 
have just turned and walked away." (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-7.) This argument is 
meritless. As the State acknowledges, "[i]n the present case, Detective Todd "show[ed] 
[Kingsley] who [he] was and told him to get off the phone, come down and talk to [him]." 
(Respondent's Brief, p.6 (citing 12/08/11 Tr., p.8, Ls.15-17.)) Surely, the order from 
Detective Todd that Mr. Kingsley "get off the phone" and come down and talk to him is 
something in the record to suggest that Mr. Kingsley was compelled to walk over to the 
officer. "So long as police do not convey a message that compliance with their requests 
is required, the encounter is deemed consensual and no reasonable suspicion is 
required." State v. Linenberger, 151 Idaho 680, 684 (Ct. App. 2011). There is nothing 
about an order to "get off the phone" that suggests that compliance is optional or that a 
reasonable person would feel free to leave. Mr. Kingsley was ordered to stop what he 
was doing and approach Detective Todd. This is conclusive evidence in the record that 
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Mr. Kingsley would not have turned and walked away. Had he been free to turn and 
walk away, he would have been free to continue using his phone, which Detective Todd 
ordered him not to do. The State's assertion thus has absolutely no support in the 
record. 
The State then asserts, "[f]rom the point Kingsley told Detective Todd he had 
'glass' on his person, the detective had probable cause to arrest Kingsley for the 
possession of paraphernalia." (Respondent's Brief, p.7.) The State then cites the 
standard for search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.7.) While the State's summation of the standard is accurate, this 
argument suffers from a fatal flaw - Mr. Kingsley did not tell Detective Todd that he had 
"glass" on his person until after he was seized by the order to get off his phone and 
approach the detective. This statement, is, therefore, the fruit of the unlawful detention 
and, thus, the search incident to arrest exception does not apply. See Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
Finally, the State asserts that, "[c]ontrary to the district court's conclusion that the 
state presented no evidence that 'Kingsley was engaged in a joint enterprise with 
Andersen or had a suspicious demeanor, made suspicious statements, or acted 
suspiciously,"' Mr. Kingsley's detention was supported by reasonable, articulable 
suspicion. (Respondent's Brief, p.9 (citing R., p.65.)) First, the State asserts that 
Mr. Anderson was a "known drug dealer." (Respondent's Brief, p.9.) While this may be 
the case, the State has cited to nothing in the record, because there is nothing in the 
record, to support the claim that the officers believed that Mr. Anderson was currently 
conducting any kind of drug transaction. The officers were there to perform a probation 
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search; they were not armed with a warrant or probable cause to believe that 
Mr. Anderson was committing a crime. It is, therefore, pure speculation that 
Mr. Kingsley was operating as a lookout. 
The State then argues, despite its concession that, "the record is limited as to 
Kingsley's connection to Andersen's residence," the mere fact that Mr. Kingsley was in 
the driveway talking on his phone is suspicious, because, "[i]t is not a normal course of 
events for people to walk onto the driveways of strangers to stop and place a call." 
(Respondent's Brief, p.10.) This argument ignores a fact of everyday life - people carry 
their cell phones with them nearly everywhere they go. A person taking a walk in their 
neighborhood who receives a call on their cell phone and stops in front of someone's 
driveway to answer it is acting suspicious, according to the State. The State's view is 
certainly not objectively reasonable. 
Finally, the State asserts, "[a]n individual's proximity to or involvement with drug 
transactions or distribution can support reasonable suspicion to frisk that individual in 
circumstances where the use of such techniques normally would not have been valid 
had the nature of the suspected criminal activity been considered less prone to 
violence." (Respondent's Brief, p.10.) This argument overlooks the fact that there is 
nothing in the record to suggest that the officers had probable cause to believe 
Mr. Anderson was dealing drugs at that time. The search of Mr. Anderson's residence 
in this case was not conducted after a determination of probable cause; it was 
conducted because Mr. Anderson was on probation and his residence was, therefore, 
subject to search by the terms of that probation. Being in the driveway of a person who 
is on probation, is not indicative of any kind of criminal activity. 
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Finally, the State's reliance on State v. Dreier, 149 Idaho 246 (Ct. App. 2003), 
and State v. Crooks, 150 Idaho 117 (Ct. App. 2010) is misplaced as the facts in those 
cases are markedly different than the facts in this case. In Dreier, "[t]he officers had 
been given consent to search the home by one of the home's occupants as a condition 
of his pre-trial release from jail on a pending charge of attempted manufacturing of 
methamphetamine." Dreier, 139 Idaho at 248. A woman at the front door was told to 
awaken Dreier and bring him outside: 
When Dreier emerged, he informed one of the officers that he was a 
visitor to the home and that he had arrived earlier that morning. Dreier 
also indicated to the officer that he was aware that the home was subject 
to a search provision. The officer asked Dreier if there were any drugs 
inside the home. Dreier responded that there were drugs located in his 
"stuff." The officer asked Dreier if there was marijuana or other controlled 
substances in the home, and Dreier replied that there might be marijuana 
in his stuff. Dreier then sought the officer's permission to go to the side of 
the home to urinate. The officer asked Dreier whether he had any 
weapons and Dreier motioned to his side. The officer observed a leather 
case attached to Dreier's belt. Dreier indicated that it was a Leatherman 
tool. The officer took the Leatherman from Dreier's belt and asked Dreier if 
he had any other weapons. Dreier stated that he did not think he did. 
Id. at 249. An officer then conducted a pat down search. Id. Mr. Dreier challenged only 
the pat down search, not the detention. Id. The Court of Appeals noted not only that 
the home was subject to search of suspected drug manufacturing activity, but also that, 
the officer who conducted the pat-down search of Dreier had been present 
when a search warrant was previously executed at the same home. 
During the previous search, officers recovered approximately sixteen 
weapons from the home and some of the weapons were loaded. The 
officer was also aware that Dreier was a frequent visitor to the home and 
that Dreier was known to carry a firearm. 
Id. at 250-51. Thus, in addition to suspecting drug activity in the residence, the officers 
knew who Mr. Dreier was, knew his connection to the residence, and knew that he was 
known to carry firearms. Mr. Kingsley was simply standing in the driveway. As the 
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State acknowledges, Mr. Kingsley's relationship to the residence was unknown to the 
officers. (Respondent's Brief, p.10.) And Mr. Kingsley was not even found inside the 
residence. 
In Crooks, while the officers were indeed conducting a probation search, the 
officers also knew that drug transactions were occurring in the apartment and that an 
individual, "had just purchased drugs in the residence." Id. at 122. The record in this 
case discloses nothing about what the officers expected to find in Mr. Anderson's 
residence. It appears they were searching the residence simply because they could. 
The record only discloses that Mr. Anderson had been dealt drugs in the past and was 
on probation for that offense. The facts in Dreier and Crooks are far different than the 
facts in this case, and thus the detention of Mr. Kingsley was not based on reasonable, 
articulable suspicion. The State has there failed to demonstrate a basis upon which to 
affirm the district court's ruling in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Kingsley respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of 
conviction and reverse the order denying his motion to suppress. 
DATED this 1st day of July, 2013. 
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